Colorado Abolished Qualified Immunity — Why Your Police Misconduct Case Isn't Dead
This is the first thing every Colorado plaintiff should know. It is also the thing most lawyers outside the civil-rights bar still get wrong.
In June 2020, Colorado passed SB 20-217, the Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act, signed by the Governor on June 19, 2020. It is codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-131. Functionally, it created a parallel state-law civil-rights cause of action that lives outside the federal § 1983 framework — and that does not permit qualified immunity as a defense.
SB 20-217 in plain language
The statute creates a civil cause of action against any Colorado peace officer who, acting under color of law, deprives a person of rights secured by the Colorado Bill of Rights. It also reaches officers who fail to intervene to stop another officer's violation. The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act — which normally walls off most suits against state and local government — does not bar this claim. The "we can't sue because they're the government" answer that defeats most plaintiffs in Colorado does not apply here.
The state-law claim is parallel to § 1983 — but without qualified immunity
Federal § 1983 cases get thrown out every day on qualified immunity. The federal doctrine — handed down in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and refined in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) — shields an officer from suit unless the right they violated was "clearly established" at the time. That is a high bar. The Supreme Court in Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (per curiam), made clear that "clearly established" means existing precedent must place the question "beyond debate." Cases that should win get tossed because no earlier case happened to involve the exact same factual posture.
Colorado's state-law claim under § 13-21-131 does not have that door. Qualified immunity is not a defense. An officer cannot win on summary judgment by arguing "no prior case said I couldn't do this." The conduct is judged against the Colorado Bill of Rights, full stop.
The $25,000 personal-liability exposure — and what it actually means
SB 20-217 also changed the indemnification math. The general rule is still that the employer (city, county, sheriff's department) pays the judgment. But if the public entity by which the officer is employed determines the officer did not act on a good-faith and reasonable belief that the conduct was lawful, the officer can be on the hook personally — for the lesser of 5% of the judgment or $25,000. Officers also lose indemnification if they are convicted of a criminal violation arising from the same conduct. The point is not that every plaintiff collects from the officer's checking account. The point is that the statute meaningfully changes the incentive landscape for the worst-actor officers and the departments that protect them.
The clock is two years — and it is already running
The statute of limitations under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-131(2) is two years from accrual. If your incident happened more than a few months ago, the clock has been running. Accrual rules get technical (the federal cousin, under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), can accrue at arraignment rather than at the arrest itself; state-law accrual is its own analysis). Do not try to figure this out from a webpage. Call a civil-rights lawyer.
Why other firms tell you "qualified immunity kills your case"
Because most personal-injury lawyers stop at the federal analysis. They run Mullenix, they hit a wall, they tell you the case is dead. They are not lying — under the federal claim, that may be the answer. They are just not finishing the analysis. In Colorado, you have a parallel state-law claim that doesn't have that ceiling. That is the moat. That is why we ask Colorado plaintiffs to talk to us before accepting "your case is dead" from anyone.
Your case may not be dead. Let's find out.
If a Colorado lawyer told you qualified immunity kills your case without analyzing § 13-21-131, get a second opinion. Bilingual intake. Denver office (303) 335-0250 · Toll-free (888) 746-5245.
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Excessive Force Under the Fourth Amendment
When an officer uses more force than the circumstances actually required — strikes, slams, tasers, K9 deployment, prone restraint, asphyxiation, gunshots — that may be an excessive-force violation under the Fourth Amendment.
The governing federal standard comes from Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): was the officer's use of force "objectively reasonable" under the totality of the circumstances? Courts look at the severity of the crime at issue, whether the person posed an immediate threat to safety, and whether the person was actively resisting or trying to flee. Crucially, the analysis happens from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene — not with the perfect hindsight of a courtroom.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), puts a hard limit on deadly force: an officer cannot use deadly force against a fleeing suspect unless the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.
What counts as excessive force
In practice, excessive-force claims in Colorado come up in patterns that repeat across cases we see:
- Force against someone who is already restrained or compliant — handcuffed, on the ground, hands up, not resisting. The continued use of force after compliance is one of the clearest excessive-force fact patterns.
- Strikes, slams, and prone restraint — knee-on-neck restraint, weight on the back of a face-down subject, repeated strikes after a person has stopped moving.
- Taser deployment — particularly against compliant subjects, against people in mental-health crisis, against people who are already on the ground, or multiple deployments after the subject is incapacitated.
- K9 deployment — dogs deployed against unarmed subjects, against people in confined spaces, against people who have surrendered, or with no verbal warning where one was practical.
- Shootings — particularly against people moving away, against people armed only with non-deadly objects, against people in mental-health crisis where de-escalation alternatives existed.
Pretrial detainees and post-conviction prisoners — the doctrinal switch
Once you are in custody, the analysis changes. For pretrial detainees, the Supreme Court in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), held that excessive-force claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment using an objective standard — the plaintiff does not have to prove the officer subjectively knew the force was unreasonable. For convicted prisoners, the Eighth Amendment standard from Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), applies, which requires actual subjective awareness of the risk. The line between the two is the moment of conviction, not the moment of arrest. We unpack this carefully because the wrong amendment in your complaint can sink an otherwise good case.
Unlawful Arrest, Detention, and Stops
An arrest without probable cause is a Fourth Amendment violation. So is a stop without reasonable suspicion. So is a continued detention after the lawful reason for the stop has ended. Each of those creates a potential civil-rights claim — and each of them happens routinely on Colorado streets and highways.
Probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and the Terry line
The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for an arrest — a reasonable basis to believe the person committed a crime. For a brief investigatory stop, the standard is reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) — articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. A limited frisk is permitted only on a separate reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. Officers who escalate a Terry stop into a full arrest without probable cause, or who extend a stop beyond the time needed to address the basis for it, may be acting unlawfully.
Pretextual traffic stops and racial profiling
Pretextual stops — where an officer uses a minor traffic violation as a cover to investigate something else — are a recurring civil-rights problem. Under the federal Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), allows an officer's subjective motive to be set aside as long as there was an objective basis for the stop. That doctrine has been criticized for the racial-profiling problem it enables; Colorado courts and policy have increasingly scrutinized pretextual stops, and the federal Fourth Amendment still applies even where state-court doctrine has not yet codified additional protection. We litigate these cases on both fronts — the federal Fourth Amendment and the state-law civil-rights claim under § 13-21-131.
The Heck v. Humphrey bar — what it does and doesn't block
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), says you generally cannot bring a § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction. In plain terms: if you were convicted of resisting arrest, you usually cannot win a § 1983 case whose theory requires proving the arrest was unlawful. Heck does not block civil-rights claims that don't undermine a conviction — for example, an excessive-force claim where the force itself is the wrong, separate from the lawfulness of the arrest. If charges were declined or dropped before any conviction, Heck does not apply at all (there is no conviction to attack). If a conviction was later dismissed, expunged, or reversed on appeal, Heck's favorable-termination requirement is satisfied. Either way, the case can move forward.
Wrongful detention beyond the arrest itself
The civil-rights problems don't stop at the moment of arrest. Overlong holds, holds without timely judicial review, holds based solely on an ICE detainer with no judicial warrant — each of those raises Fourth Amendment problems. The ICE-detainer issue matters especially for Colorado plaintiffs with immigration consequences: federal courts have been clear that local agencies cannot hold someone past their release date based on a civil immigration detainer without independent legal authority. If that happened to you or a family member, talk to us.
First Amendment Retaliation — Recording, Protesting, Speaking Back
The First Amendment protects your right to record the police in public, to attend protests, to speak critically of officers, to file complaints, and to refuse to be intimidated out of any of those activities. Retaliatory arrests, retaliatory citations, and retaliatory uses of force in response to protected speech are civil-rights violations.
Recording the police in public
Federal circuits have increasingly recognized a constitutional right to record police carrying out their duties in public, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. In Irizarry v. Yehia, 38 F.4th 1276 (10th Cir. 2022), the Tenth Circuit recognized that the First Amendment protects filming the police in public, joining the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. The practical reality is that officers who order people to stop filming, who delete footage, who arrest people for filming, or who seize cameras without a warrant are exposing themselves and their departments to civil-rights liability.
Retaliatory arrest doctrine after Nieves v. Bartlett
Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019), is the case to understand. The Supreme Court held that the existence of probable cause for the arrest generally defeats a retaliatory-arrest claim — but it carved out a narrow exception: if the plaintiff can show that officers typically do not exercise their discretion to arrest in those circumstances, the claim can survive even with probable cause. Translation: a citation that officers normally hand out as a warning, used as an arrest hook because the person was filming or arguing, may still be a constitutional violation.
For retaliatory prosecution — where the harm is the charges, not the arrest — Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), requires plaintiffs to plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the underlying charges. The two doctrines work together and both are technical. Bring a lawyer.
Protest arrests and dispersal-order misuse
Mass arrests at protests, misuse of unlawful-assembly or failure-to-disperse charges to clear lawful gatherings, kettling, and retaliatory force against protesters are recurring civil-rights problems. Colorado courts and the federal courts in this circuit have repeatedly held that the First Amendment does not vanish because a crowd is large or because a few people in it are unruly.
Federal § 1983 Claims — When and Why They Still Matter
The federal civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has been the workhorse of police-misconduct litigation since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), confirmed that the statute reaches state actors who misuse the authority of their office. Even with Colorado's state-law claim, the federal claim still matters for most plaintiffs in this state. Here is why we usually pursue both.
What § 1983 gives you that the state claim doesn't
- Federal court availability. § 1983 cases can be brought in federal district court, with federal procedural rules, broader discovery practice, and federal-judge experience handling civil-rights cases.
- Fee-shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A prevailing plaintiff in a § 1983 case is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. This is what makes contingency-fee civil-rights work economically viable.
- No $25,000 cap on the officer's personal exposure. Federal judgments collect against the available defendant — which in most cases is the department or the city through indemnification, but is not capped statutorily.
- Broader injunctive remedies. Federal courts can order policy changes, training requirements, and monitoring — relief that has no clean state-law analog.
Qualified immunity — and why the state claim is still the floor
The price of pursuing a § 1983 claim is the qualified-immunity gauntlet. Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), and Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), federal courts will dismiss a § 1983 claim against an individual officer unless the plaintiff can show the right was "clearly established" in a way no reasonable officer could have missed. The doctrine has gotten meaningful pushback in recent years — Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020) (per curiam), is a per curiam reversal where the Supreme Court rejected QI in obvious-violation circumstances — but the doctrine is still on the books and still defeats most federal claims.
The Tenth Circuit, like other federal circuits, has continued to apply the Harlow / Pearson / Mullenix "clearly established" rigor — and like other circuits, has had to absorb the Supreme Court's reminder in Taylor v. Riojas (2020) that qualified immunity is not available when a constitutional violation is sufficiently obvious. The pillar's practical posture: we run both claims in parallel. The state-law claim under § 13-21-131 is the floor under your case. The federal claim is the upside.
Monell Liability — Suing the Department, Not Just the Officer
When the misconduct traces to a department's policy, custom, or failure to train, the department itself — the city, the county, the sheriff's office — can be liable directly. This is Monell liability, named after Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Monell held that municipalities are "persons" under § 1983, but liable only for their own policies — not for an officer's conduct under a respondeat-superior theory. That means a Monell claim has to identify the policy or pattern: a written policy, an unwritten custom, a pattern of similar violations, ratification of the officer's conduct by a final policymaker, or a failure to train so deficient that it amounts to deliberate indifference.
Failure-to-train claims under City of Canton
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), set the bar for failure-to-train cases: deliberate indifference to a known or obvious risk that the failure would result in constitutional violations. It is a high bar — courts routinely dismiss thin failure-to-train pleadings — but it is the right framing where a department has been on notice that its training (on de-escalation, on K9 deployment, on mental-health response, on cell-monitoring, on use-of-force documentation) is producing constitutional violations and the department has done nothing.
Why Monell matters for damages
Departments and cities have collectable budgets. Individual officers generally don't. The practical reality of civil-rights damages — especially in serious cases — is that the meaningful recovery is the city or the county or the sheriff. Monell is how plaintiffs get there. It is also how civil-rights litigation drives policy change: a settlement or judgment against a department for a policy or pattern is often paired with practice reforms that protect future plaintiffs.
Find out if your case has a Monell angle.
A Monell claim against the department changes the recovery posture and can drive policy reform. Bilingual intake. Denver office (303) 335-0250 · Toll-free (888) 746-5245.
TALK TO A CIVIL-RIGHTS LAWYERFederal Officers, Border Patrol, and Bivens
When the officer who violated your rights is a federal agent — Border Patrol, ICE, FBI, U.S. Marshals, federal contract guards — § 1983 does not reach them. § 1983 only applies to state actors. The doctrine for suing a federal officer directly under the Constitution is Bivens, and it has been narrowed almost to the vanishing point.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents (1971)
The Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), recognized an implied federal cause of action for damages against federal officers who violate the Fourth Amendment. For decades, Bivens was the federal-officer analog to § 1983.
How Egbert v. Boule (2022) closed the door
A series of Supreme Court decisions — Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017), Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93 (2020), and the dominant current authority Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022) — has severely narrowed Bivens. Egbert held that courts should refuse to extend Bivens to any new context if Congress is "better suited" to authorize the remedy, and rejected Bivens claims for First Amendment retaliation and for Fourth Amendment violations in immigration-enforcement contexts at the border.
The practical reality: Bivens today survives in a narrow zone of traditional Fourth Amendment claims that closely track the Bivens fact pattern itself. New contexts — especially those touching immigration enforcement — face a near-impossible doctrinal hurdle. We do not promise Bivens remedies. We pursue them carefully where the facts fit, and we look hard for alternative theories (state-law claims against federal contractors, claims against state actors who participated jointly, claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act where it applies) when Bivens itself is foreclosed.
Why this matters for Colorado plaintiffs
If you were stopped, searched, detained, or injured by Border Patrol on a Colorado interstate, by ICE during enforcement in your neighborhood, or by federal contract guards at an immigration-detention facility, the legal framework for your case is different from the framework for a case against a Denver police officer. We hold both ends. We have the immigration-defense practice that goes with the civil-rights practice, and we route federal-officer-misconduct cases through the analysis that fits them.
In-Custody Injury, Jail Death, and Detention Conditions
Once a person is in custody — booked into a jail, held in a holding cell, held at a federal-contract detention facility like GEO Aurora — the legal framework for their treatment shifts from the Fourth Amendment to the Eighth (for convicted prisoners) or the Fourteenth (for pretrial detainees, immigration detainees, and others held without a conviction).
The pretrial-detainee standard after Kingsley
For pretrial detainees, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), set the standard for excessive-force claims: the force must be objectively unreasonable. The plaintiff does not have to prove the officer subjectively knew it was unreasonable. Several circuits have extended Kingsley's objective standard to other pretrial-detainee conditions — medical neglect, failure to protect, suicide-watch failures — while others have retained Farmer's subjective standard for non-force conditions claims. The Tenth Circuit has not squarely resolved the question, and the answer can matter materially to how a pretrial-detainee medical-neglect or jail-conditions case is pleaded.
The convicted-prisoner standard under Farmer v. Brennan
For convicted prisoners, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), requires the plaintiff to show that the official actually knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety — a subjective standard. It is a higher bar than Kingsley. The fact patterns that meet it are typically the most egregious: ignored cries for medical help, deliberate refusals to intervene in foreseeable inmate-on-inmate violence, prolonged confinement in conditions a reasonable official would recognize as inhumane.
Where these claims arise in Colorado
- County jails: medical neglect, suicide-watch failures, force used during booking, force used to extract inmates from cells, failure to protect from inmate-on-inmate assault.
- ICE-detention facilities: GEO Aurora and other federal-contract facilities raise distinct legal frameworks (constitutional claims, Federal Tort Claims Act claims where applicable, claims against contractor staff under state law). Conditions cases at these facilities sit at the intersection of civil rights and immigration — which is where our practice lives.
- Police holding cells: injuries during pre-booking detention, including failure to provide medical attention to someone who was injured during arrest.
What to Do If You Were Hurt or Wronged by Police in Colorado
If this happened recently — or even months ago, as long as you are inside the two-year window — there are concrete things you can do right now to protect your case. None of this replaces talking to a lawyer. Call first if you can. But if you cannot reach a lawyer today, do the items below today.
Preserve evidence right now. Photograph injuries (including bruising as it develops over the next several days — early photos do not capture the full picture). Save the clothes you were wearing if there is blood, tearing, or other physical evidence on them. Write down everything you remember while it is fresh: the officers' names if you have them, badge numbers, vehicle numbers, time and location, what was said, what was done, in what sequence. Get the names and contact information of every witness, including bystanders who were filming.
Get medical attention even if the officer told you to walk it off. Medical records are the spine of the damages case. Concussions, soft-tissue injuries, internal injuries, and post-incident psychological trauma all matter, and all require contemporaneous documentation to be provable later. If you cannot afford care, go to an emergency department anyway — the visit creates a record.
Request body-camera footage early. Colorado law (under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-31-902 et seq.) requires local law enforcement agencies and the Colorado State Patrol to use body-worn cameras and to release unedited footage within 21 days of a misconduct-complaint request, subject to limited exceptions. Departments do not always produce footage on time, and exceptions can be invoked aggressively. We know how to demand the footage and litigate when it isn't produced — but the earlier the request goes in, the better.
File a formal complaint with the department or sheriff's office — but understand what it is and what it isn't. A formal complaint creates a paper trail and triggers internal-affairs review. It is not a substitute for a civil lawsuit. Internal-affairs findings rarely correlate with civil-rights liability, and a "not sustained" finding does not mean you do not have a case.
Statute of limitations is two years — but do not rely on that. Accrual rules and tolling get technical, and Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), complicates the federal-claim accrual. Treat the clock as already running. Call a civil-rights lawyer now.
Do not give a recorded statement to the department's risk-management office, to an insurance adjuster, or to anyone other than your own lawyer. A recorded statement to the other side, before you have counsel, is the most common way Colorado plaintiffs damage their own cases.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I sue a police officer in Colorado even though qualified immunity exists?
Yes — in most situations. Qualified immunity is a federal doctrine that applies to federal § 1983 claims. Colorado has a parallel state-law civil-rights claim under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-131 that does not permit qualified immunity as a defense. Many cases where the federal claim is defeated by qualified immunity still have a viable state-law claim. If a lawyer told you "qualified immunity kills your case" without analyzing the state-law claim, get a second opinion.
How is SB 20-217 different from federal § 1983?
SB 20-217 (codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-131) is Colorado's state-law civil-rights claim. § 1983 is the federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The biggest differences: qualified immunity is not a defense under the state claim; the state claim doesn't get fee-shifting under § 1988 (it has its own fee-shifting under § 13-21-131(3)); the state claim runs against Colorado peace officers and reaches "failure to intervene" liability; the federal claim has broader federal-court procedural advantages and broader injunctive remedies. Most Colorado police-misconduct cases plead both claims.
How long do I have to file a civil-rights lawsuit in Colorado?
Two years from accrual under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-131(2) for the state-law claim. The federal § 1983 statute of limitations in Colorado is also two years (borrowed from the state personal-injury SOL). Accrual rules are technical and case-specific — under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), a federal false-arrest claim can accrue at arraignment rather than at the arrest. Do not rely on a website to calculate your deadline. Call a lawyer.
What can I recover if I win? Are there caps on damages?
In a federal § 1983 case: compensatory damages (medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, emotional distress), punitive damages in cases of malice or reckless indifference, and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). In a Colorado § 13-21-131 case: compensatory damages and reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff. There are no statutory damages caps on the civil-rights claims themselves. The $25,000 figure that sometimes gets cited is the cap on the officer's personal liability when the employer determines the officer did not act in good faith — it is not a cap on what you can recover from the department.
Will the officer pay personally, or will the city, county, or sheriff's department?
In most Colorado police-misconduct cases, the employing agency pays the judgment through its indemnification program or its insurance carrier. SB 20-217 creates a narrow window for personal officer liability — capped at the lesser of 5% of judgment or $25,000 — when the agency determines the officer did not act on a good-faith and reasonable belief that the conduct was lawful. Officers who are convicted of a crime arising from the same conduct lose indemnification entirely. The point of these provisions is to change incentives, not to guarantee recovery from the officer's personal assets.
What if the DA declined to charge the officer — can I still sue?
Yes. Criminal prosecution and civil-rights liability are different systems with different standards of proof, different incentives, and different goals. The DA's charging decision is not binding on a civil-rights case. Many of the largest civil-rights settlements in Colorado history involve incidents where no officer was criminally charged.
Do I need bodycam footage to have a case?
No. Bodycam footage helps — and Colorado law requires it in many situations under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-31-902 et seq. — but cases get built and won on witness testimony, medical records, dispatch logs, internal-affairs records, third-party video (bystander cell-phone video, business surveillance, traffic cameras), and the officer's own written reports. Lack of bodycam footage is not a reason to assume you don't have a case.
Can I sue if I was arrested but the charges were dropped?
Yes — and a dropped or dismissed case is often helpful to the civil claim. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a § 1983 claim is generally barred only if winning the civil case would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing conviction. If charges were declined or dismissed before any conviction, Heck does not apply at all. If a conviction was later overturned, Heck's favorable-termination requirement is met. Either way, you can generally bring your civil-rights case.
What if I was undocumented at the time of the incident — can I still bring a civil-rights claim?
Yes. Immigration status does not strip you of constitutional protections. Undocumented people in Colorado have the same Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, and Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment rights as anyone else. Our firm holds the criminal-defense and immigration-defense practice areas that often run alongside these civil-rights cases, so you do not have to manage two separate firms to bring your claim safely.
Do you handle Washington civil-rights cases?
Our civil-rights practice is Colorado-anchored — and SB 20-217 only applies to Colorado peace officers. We do maintain Washington-state offices (Seattle/Kent and Walla Walla) and route Washington civil-rights inquiries through our contact form for triage.
Why Novo Legal for Police Misconduct Cases
We are a Colorado-rooted civil-rights firm. We take cases other firms write off because of qualified immunity, because the DA didn't charge, because the criminal case is still pending, or because the client is undocumented. We run the SB 20-217 analysis alongside the federal § 1983 analysis, and we name departments and supervisors as Monell defendants when the facts support it.
We are bilingual. Novo Legal Group serves Colorado clients in English and Spanish, and that capability is institutional, not a brochure line. Our intake handles Spanish-language calls without an interpreter chain. Our pleadings, demand letters, and client communications run in both languages when the client needs them to. For Colorado's working-class, Latino, Black, and immigrant communities — who carry the heaviest share of police-misconduct incidents — that bilingual posture is the difference between a case that gets investigated and a case that doesn't.
We hold both ends of crimmigration-overlap cases. If your civil-rights claim arises from a stop, an arrest, an in-custody injury, or a detention that also has immigration consequences, you do not have to retain two separate firms. The criminal-defense practice, the immigration-defense practice, and the civil-rights practice live under one roof at Novo Legal.
This page is authored by Aaron Elinoff, Managing Partner.
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