Colorado Abolished Qualified Immunity for State-Law Civil-Rights Claims — Here's What That Means for Your Case
In June 2020, Governor Jared Polis signed Senate Bill 20-217 — the Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act — into law. It is now codified at C.R.S. § 13-21-131 and titled "Civil action for deprivation of rights." It is the most consequential change to Colorado civil-rights litigation in a generation.
Here is what it actually does, in plain English.
SB 20-217 in plain language
SB 20-217 created a new state-law cause of action against any "peace officer" who, under color of law, subjects another person to the deprivation of individual rights secured by the Colorado Constitution. The cause of action exists in addition to whatever federal claims a plaintiff may have under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — it does not replace them, and the same incident can give rise to claims in both forums.
What sets the state claim apart is the next sentence of the statute. The bill text reads, directly: "Qualified immunity is not a defense to liability pursuant to this section." That is the entire reason the law exists. Qualified immunity is the federal doctrine that has, for decades, allowed police officers to escape liability for serious constitutional violations because no prior court ruling had addressed precisely those facts. Colorado said: not in our state-law courts.
The state-law claim under C.R.S. § 13-21-131 — parallel to § 1983, without the QI defense
The structure of the Colorado claim deliberately tracks federal § 1983. A plaintiff must show that a peace officer, acting under color of law, deprived them of a state-constitutional right. The substantive constitutional analysis — what counts as excessive force, what counts as an unlawful seizure — is informed by federal precedent but applied through the lens of the Colorado Bill of Rights.
The critical procedural difference is that the qualified-immunity defense that federal courts routinely apply to § 1983 cases is unavailable under § 13-21-131. The officer cannot tell a Colorado state-court judge, "no prior published opinion put me on notice that this exact conduct was unconstitutional, so the case should be dismissed before discovery." That argument is foreclosed by the statute.
Personal officer liability up to $25,000 — and the willful-and-wanton indemnification carve-out
Under § 13-21-131, peace officers can be held personally liable for a portion of the judgment or settlement. The bill provides that an officer is personally responsible for 5 percent of the judgment or settlement, or $25,000, whichever is less, if the officer's employer determines that the officer did not act upon a good-faith and reasonable belief that the action was lawful. The political subdivision is required to indemnify the officer for the remainder — except where the employer makes that "no good faith" determination, or where the officer was criminally convicted for the conduct giving rise to the claim.
For plaintiffs, this matters in two practical ways. First, the bulk of any judgment is paid by a public entity, which means recovery is collectable in most cases. Second, the personal-liability mechanism applies real consequence to the officer in the cases where the employer agrees the officer crossed the line. That is a structural shift from the pre-SB 20-217 world, where officers paid nothing personally and departments fought every claim through qualified immunity.
We say what we tell every client at the front end of these cases: the personal-liability provision is a feature of the statute, not a guarantee. Whether it triggers depends on the employer's determination, the facts of the incident, and the outcome of any underlying criminal proceeding against the officer. Do not call us expecting "the officer pays personally" — call us so we can investigate what actually happened and pursue every available remedy under the statute.
Attorney's fees and what plaintiffs can recover
SB 20-217 includes a fee-shifting provision. A plaintiff who prevails in a § 13-21-131 lawsuit is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. A defendant who successfully defends against a claim the court finds frivolous can recover fees from the plaintiff — which is one of several reasons our firm investigates aggressively before filing, and turns down cases that don't have a real factual foundation.
Damages under § 13-21-131 include compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and the costs of litigation. There is no statutory cap on compensatory damages (the $25,000 figure is a cap on the officer's personal contribution, not on the plaintiff's recovery).
Why this matters — cases other firms told you were dead may be alive in Colorado
Most of the firms that field civil-rights inquiries in Colorado run the federal qualified-immunity analysis first and stop there. If the case looks dead in federal court, they decline. That analysis is incomplete, and we see it weekly.
The Colorado state-law claim under § 13-21-131 is a separate analysis, in a separate forum, under a different statute. A case that fails federal QI may still survive — and reach a jury — in Colorado state court. The pre-litigation conversation we have with you is: what are the facts, what are the available claims (state, federal, or both), and what is the strongest forum.
Civil-rights cases against Colorado peace officers are not categorically foreclosed by qualified immunity anymore. They were never as foreclosed as the standard advice suggested. If a Colorado firm told you "QI bars your case" without analyzing § 13-21-131, get a second opinion. Quickly — see the statute of limitations section below.
Federal § 1983 Claims — When and Why They Still Matter
The Colorado state-law claim is the reason this pillar exists, but federal § 1983 is not obsolete in Colorado. Many of our cases plead both. Here is why.
The § 1983 framework
Section 1983 is the federal civil-rights statute that allows individuals to sue state and local government employees who, acting "under color of state law," violate their federal constitutional rights. The statute traces to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and was given its modern shape in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which confirmed that § 1983 reaches conduct that is illegal under state law as well as conduct that state law purports to authorize.
In plain English: § 1983 lets you sue a state or local government employee who, while doing their job, violated your federal constitutional rights — and they can't escape it just because state law also forbids what they did.
Why federal § 1983 is still worth pursuing alongside the state SB 20-217 claim
In a typical Colorado civil-rights case where both claims are available, our team evaluates pleading both. Reasons include:
- Federal fee-shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 runs parallel to the Colorado § 13-21-131 fee provision.
- Federal court availability can be tactically valuable in some matters — broader discovery rules, certain procedural advantages, different judicial pools.
- Injunctive relief at the federal level can reach patterns and practices that a state-court damages claim does not.
- There is no $25,000 / 5% officer-contribution cap on the federal side — the structure of the federal claim is different (and federal qualified immunity remains a hurdle, but in a case where the conduct was sufficiently egregious to defeat QI, the recovery posture is different).
Monell municipal liability — suing the department, not just the officer
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), established that municipalities and local government entities can be sued under § 1983 — but only when the constitutional violation results from an official policy, an unwritten custom, or a failure to train, supervise, or discipline. Local governments cannot be sued on a respondeat superior theory for the conduct of an individual officer.
What that means in practice: if your case is that a single officer beat someone, the claim is against the officer (and, under Colorado law, against the political subdivision for indemnification purposes). If your case is that the department allowed this — through a pattern of similar incidents, a written use-of-force policy that pushed officers toward escalation, or a training deficit the department knew about and ignored — that is a Monell claim against the municipality. Monell claims are harder, but the cases that succeed produce real institutional change.
If your search brought you here on the phrase "Monell claim Colorado," your case may be one of those. We litigate them.
Bivens against federal officers — what's left after Egbert v. Boule
Federal officers — Border Patrol, ICE, FBI, U.S. Marshals — are not state actors. They cannot be sued under § 1983. The Supreme Court created an implied federal damages remedy in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and for decades that remedy was the only damages path against federal officers who violated the Constitution.
That path has been dramatically narrowed. In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), the Supreme Court declined to extend Bivens to a First Amendment retaliation claim and to a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim arising in a cross-border immigration-enforcement context — and the opinion strongly suggests the Court will be unwilling to extend Bivens to most new contexts going forward.
We are honest about what this means. After Egbert, suing a federal immigration officer personally for damages is extremely difficult. State and local officers remain reachable under § 1983 and Colorado's § 13-21-131. For Novo Legal — a bilingual firm whose civil-rights work overlaps heavily with our immigration practice — the post-Egbert landscape means we evaluate every federal-officer case carefully, including whether there are non-Bivens remedies (injunctive relief, statutory claims, claims against contractor entities) that better fit the facts. We don't promise Bivens recoveries that aren't there.
Qualified Immunity at the Federal Level — Why It Matters Less in Colorado Than Other States
Federal qualified immunity is the doctrine that shields government officials from § 1983 liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" — the standard articulated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In practice, the doctrine operates as a "clearly established law" test: unless a prior court of controlling authority has held that materially similar conduct was unconstitutional, the officer is immune.
The doctrine has been criticized — by judges, by scholars, by both sides of the political spectrum — for foreclosing claims where the conduct is plainly unconstitutional but the prior-precedent box is empty. The Supreme Court has cracked the doctrine modestly in recent years. Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020), was a per curiam reversal in which the Court held that qualified immunity does not protect officers when the constitutional violation is sufficiently obvious — even without a prior case on identical facts. The plaintiff there had been held for six days in cells covered in human waste.
Taylor is a crack, not a sea change. Federal qualified immunity continues to defeat most § 1983 cases at the summary-judgment stage. That is the reality.
The Colorado response to that reality was SB 20-217. The state-law claim under § 13-21-131 does not allow qualified immunity as a defense — full stop. That is why most national firms that decline Colorado cases on a federal-QI analysis are leaving viable state-law cases on the table. We don't.
Civil Rights Case vs. Criminal Case — Different Forums, Different Rules
If you were arrested or charged with a crime in the same incident that gives rise to your civil-rights claim, two parallel proceedings may run at once. Understanding the difference matters.
The criminal case is the state (or federal government) prosecuting you for an alleged offense. The State is the plaintiff. You are the defendant. The standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. The remedies are conviction or acquittal; potentially incarceration, probation, fines.
The civil-rights case is you (or your family) suing the government or its employees for damages. You are the plaintiff. The officer and/or the political subdivision are the defendants. The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not). The remedies are money damages, attorney's fees, and in some cases injunctive relief.
Two practical implications:
1. Your civil-rights case is not your criminal-defense case. A civil-rights lawsuit does not get the criminal charges dismissed. (We have a separate criminal-defense team that handles charges; if both are at play in your situation, the teams coordinate.) 2. The status of the criminal case affects what civil-rights claims are available. As noted above, Heck v. Humphrey may bar certain § 1983 damages until a conviction is reversed. If you're facing pending criminal charges arising from the same incident, the timing and sequencing matters — and that is exactly why early consultation is essential.
What to Do If Your Civil Rights Were Violated
If you believe a peace officer or government employee violated your rights, the steps below are general guidance, not legal advice for your specific situation. Talk to a lawyer about your facts.
1. Preserve evidence — immediately
Document what happened while your memory is fresh. Photograph any injuries from multiple angles, over multiple days as bruising develops. Save any clothing showing damage. Write down the names and badge numbers of every officer involved if you have them. Get the contact information for any witnesses — civilians and officers. Request bodycam and dashcam footage in writing to every agency that may hold it; preservation requests should go out as soon as possible. Save text messages, voicemails, social-media posts, and any video footage you or anyone else captured of the incident.
2. Get medical attention
If you were injured, document the injuries with medical providers. Medical records are evidence of both the injury and its severity. Treatment records also help defeat the standard defense argument that injuries were exaggerated or pre-existing.
3. File a formal complaint with the department or internal affairs
A complaint to the department's internal affairs unit creates an official paper trail. It is not a substitute for a civil-rights lawsuit, and the agency's investigation will not adjudicate your damages claim. But it preserves a contemporaneous record of what you reported and when. Some jurisdictions also have civilian oversight or independent monitor offices that accept complaints — we can help identify the right channel.
4. Do not give recorded statements to law-enforcement insurers before talking to a lawyer
If you receive a call from the city attorney's office, the county risk-management office, or an insurance adjuster representing the agency, do not give a recorded statement before you have spoken with civil-rights counsel. Anything you say can be used to defeat your later claim. Our intake team will walk you through how to handle those contacts.
5. Call an attorney — before the clock runs out
Colorado civil-rights claims have a two-year statute of limitations. Under C.R.S. § 13-21-131(5), "a civil action pursuant to this section must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues." Federal § 1983 claims in Colorado also follow a two-year limitations period, borrowed from Colorado's personal-injury statute. Two years sounds like a long time. It is not. Evidence disappears, bodycam-retention windows expire, and witnesses become harder to find every week. For false-arrest claims, Wallace v. Kato clarified that the clock starts running when the plaintiff is detained pursuant to legal process — typically at arraignment — not when charges are later dropped. Equitable-tolling and accrual-rule edge cases exist, but they are exactly the kind of issues you do not want to litigate after the fact.
The simple version: call a Colorado civil-rights attorney immediately. Not next month. Not after the criminal case is resolved. Now.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I sue a police officer in Colorado even though qualified immunity exists?
Yes, in most cases. Colorado's SB 20-217 — codified at C.R.S. § 13-21-131 — created a state-law civil-rights claim that does not allow qualified immunity as a defense. The federal qualified-immunity doctrine still applies to federal § 1983 claims brought in federal court, but a Colorado plaintiff can pursue the state-law claim in Colorado state court without facing the federal QI bar. Many civil-rights cases that would be foreclosed in federal court are viable in state court. Whether your specific case has a viable state-law claim depends on the facts — call us to evaluate.
How is SB 20-217 different from federal § 1983?
Both statutes let a plaintiff sue a peace officer for constitutional violations, but they run in different forums under different rules. Federal § 1983 is a federal statute, litigated in federal court, with the federal qualified-immunity defense available to the officer. Colorado's SB 20-217 / § 13-21-131 is a state statute, litigated in Colorado state court, with qualified immunity unavailable as a defense. Many Colorado cases plead both. The remedies, fee-shifting provisions, and damages structures differ in important ways — those differences shape which forum is strongest for a given case.
How long do I have to file a civil-rights lawsuit in Colorado?
Two years for most Colorado civil-rights claims. Colorado's SB 20-217 statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-131(5), requires a civil action to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Federal § 1983 claims in Colorado are also subject to a two-year limitations period borrowed from Colorado's personal-injury statute. For false-arrest claims, the clock typically starts when the plaintiff is detained pursuant to legal process (arraignment) under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) — not when charges are later dropped. Edge cases on accrual and tolling exist, and they are fact-specific. The practical takeaway: call a Colorado civil-rights attorney as soon as possible after an incident.
What can I recover if I win? Are there caps?
A successful civil-rights plaintiff in Colorado can recover compensatory damages (for medical bills, lost wages, pain and suffering, emotional distress), attorney's fees, and the costs of litigation. There is no statutory cap on compensatory damages under either SB 20-217 or federal § 1983 in most categories. The $25,000 figure that gets cited around SB 20-217 is the cap on the officer's personal contribution in cases where the employer determines the officer did not act in good faith — it is not a cap on what the plaintiff recovers, and the political subdivision generally indemnifies the rest.
Will the officer pay personally, or will the city or county?
In most cases, the political subdivision pays the bulk of any judgment or settlement under SB 20-217's indemnification provision. The officer is personally responsible for 5 percent of the judgment or settlement, or $25,000, whichever is less, only if the employer determines the officer did not act on a good-faith and reasonable belief that the action was lawful — or where the officer was criminally convicted for the conduct giving rise to the claim. Most plaintiffs care more about recovery than about which entity writes the check; the statute is structured so most recoveries are collectable.
What if the DA declined to charge the officer — can I still sue?
Yes. A district attorney's decision not to pursue criminal charges against an officer has no bearing on a civil-rights lawsuit. Criminal and civil cases run on entirely different rules — different burdens of proof (beyond-a-reasonable-doubt versus preponderance of the evidence), different remedies, different plaintiffs (the state versus you). Some of the largest civil-rights settlements in Colorado history have arisen from incidents in which no officer was ever criminally charged. The lack of a criminal charge does not mean the officer did nothing wrong; it means the prosecutor declined to take that case. Your civil-rights case is a different question.
Do I need bodycam footage to have a case?
No, but it helps. Many of the strongest civil-rights cases involve some combination of bodycam footage, dashcam footage, civilian recordings, witness statements, and medical records. The absence of one piece does not foreclose the case if the rest of the evidence is strong. If the agency claims no bodycam exists (or that it "malfunctioned"), that itself can be evidence — and there are litigation tools for preserving and obtaining the footage if it does exist. Preserve any private video you or witnesses have, and call us immediately.
What about Washington State — do you handle WA civil-rights cases?
Yes — our Seattle/Kent office serves South King County and the Puget Sound, and our Walla Walla office covers Eastern Washington. Washington civil-rights practice runs on a different statutory and case-law framework than Colorado: Washington does not have an SB 20-217 equivalent, and federal § 1983 with the federal qualified-immunity defense is the primary path for most Washington cases. We evaluate Washington matters through our Northwest intake — schedule a consultation via our contact form to talk through your case.
Why Novo Legal for Civil-Rights Cases
We are a Colorado-rooted, bilingual firm built to litigate the cases other firms decline. Our civil-rights team takes Colorado state-law claims under SB 20-217 alongside federal § 1983 work, with case strategy informed by years of practice at the intersection of civil rights and immigration enforcement. The work is not transactional. We don't run a content-mill intake operation. Cases that come into our civil-rights practice get evaluated by attorneys who actually try these cases.
What we bring to a civil-rights matter: a working knowledge of C.R.S. § 13-21-131 — the statute most national plaintiff firms have not yet adapted their practice around. Litigation experience with claims against state and local peace officers, county jail systems, and the immigration-detention infrastructure that runs through Colorado and the Pacific Northwest. Bilingual intake and case staffing — most of our team is fluent in Spanish, and our community-rooted practice means we don't outsource client communication to a translation service.
What we don't promise: a specific outcome on your case. Civil-rights litigation is hard, the defense bar is well-resourced, and even the strongest cases take time. What we will promise is that we'll tell you straight what we see in your facts, what claims are available, what timing looks like, and what we think the realistic path is. If your case isn't a fit for our practice, we'll tell you that — and where possible we'll route you to a firm that can help.
Aaron Elinoff and Bryce Downer founded Novo Legal on the conviction that immigration and civil-rights work belong in the same firm — because the families we represent live at the intersection of both. That is still how we practice.
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