When Paying a Smuggler Blocks Good Moral Character: The BIA's 2026 Ruling in Matter of L-L-R-
Aaron Elinoff
A July 2026 Board of Immigration Appeals decision held that a father who paid a smuggler to bring his son to the United States could not show the good moral character that 10-year cancellation of removal requires. The same bar applies to naturalization, VAWA self-petitions, and voluntary departure, each over its own period.
On July 31, 2026, the Board of Immigration Appeals decided Matter of L-L-R-, 29 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2026). A father who paid a smuggler in 2021 to bring his teenage son from Guatemala to the United States lost his cancellation of removal case, because that payment blocked a finding of good moral character.
The decision applies directly to people seeking 10-year cancellation of removal who, within the ten years before the final decision on their application, paid someone to bring a child or other relative to the United States, including arrangements where the smuggler's part ended at the border. The Board's reading of the smuggling ground also binds immigration judges and DHS officers, including USCIS, so it matters wherever the same good moral character bar applies: naturalization, VAWA self-petitions, and voluntary departure at the end of removal proceedings, each measured over its own period. The outcome in L-L-R- also turned on what the record did not contain, addressed later on this page.
Aaron Elinoff, Managing Partner at Novo Legal Group, reviewed this explainer.
Last reviewed: September 25, 2026.
A past smuggling arrangement can complicate a pending immigration case in ways that are easy to miss. Schedule a consultation with Novo Legal's immigration team to go through the facts and dates that matter.
Schedule a consultationWhat the Board Decided in Matter of L-L-R- (July 2026)
The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, had hired and paid a smuggler in 2021 to bring his 14-year-old son from Guatemala to the United States, where the respondent and his wife were already living. He arranged this, the Immigration Judge found, because the child lacked appropriate family care back home, and he knew his son had no authorization to enter the country.
The Immigration Judge pretermitted his application for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), on good moral character grounds, and the Board dismissed his appeal.
Before the Board, he argued that paying someone to bring his son to the U.S.-Mexico border was not the same as assisting an unlawful entry, especially since the child presented himself at a port of entry and applied for asylum on his own.
The Board rejected that argument. It relied on the INA's definition of "admission," which the Supreme Court quoted in Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 146 S. Ct. 2079, 2087 (2026): a lawful entry "after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." Citing an Eighth Circuit decision, Brizuela v. Garland, 71 F.4th 1087, 1091 n.3 (8th Cir. 2023), the Board concluded that applying for asylum is "not a manner of legal entry." Mullin itself decided a different question, what "arrives in the United States" means in the asylum statute, and the Board used that ruling to contrast the asylum statute's wording with the smuggling ground's broader "to enter or to try to enter." The son had no documents that would have let him enter lawfully, and the record contained nothing to show a different path existed.
Recognizing the father's interest in reuniting with his son, the Board held that this interest did not take the conduct outside the statute. It pointed to the danger smuggling poses to unaccompanied children throughout the journey, noted that he had not tried to accompany his son and did not claim any effort to shield him from those risks, and called this the type of conduct Congress intended to prevent.
We think that is a hard result.
The Good Moral Character Smuggling Bar, Explained
INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3), precludes a finding of good moral character for anyone described in INA § 212(a)(6)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E), "whether inadmissible or not." A person does not have to be found inadmissible for smuggling. Fitting the description is enough. The bar applies when a person fits that description during the period for which good moral character must be shown (INA § 101(f), opening clause).
No criminal charge or conviction is required either. Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) is a civil immigration ground, separate from the federal smuggling and harboring offenses in 8 U.S.C. § 1324, and Matter of L-L-R- turned on the civil ground alone; the decision does not rest on any criminal charge or conviction. A criminal smuggling charge, federal or under Colorado law, raises separate immigration questions this page does not cover.
Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) reaches anyone who "at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law." Entry does not have to succeed. Helping someone try to enter counts the same as helping a completed entry.
As of September 2026, that language has not changed.
Two assumptions about this provision do not hold up: that the smuggling assistance does not count because the entry attempt failed, or because the relative later obtained some kind of status. Neither fact, on its own, takes the conduct outside the statute. Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) reaches an attempt to enter, and a relative's later grant of status does not by itself make the original entry lawful.
We think both assumptions are risky.
Each Immigration Benefit Has Its Own Look-Back Period
Section 101(f)(3) has no single clock.
Each benefit measures good moral character over its own period, so the same smuggling arrangement can fall inside one benefit's window and outside another's.
Cancellation of Removal
The 10-year period runs backward from the date of the final decision, a rule set in Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793, 797-98 (BIA 2005). L-L-R- applied it directly. The smuggling arrangement happened in 2021, and the Board decided the appeal in 2026. That is well inside ten years. Our firm's cancellation of removal guide covers the other three eligibility elements.
Naturalization
INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), sets a five-year period for most naturalization applicants (three years for many spouses of U.S. citizens, under INA § 319(a)), and good moral character must continue from filing until the oath (8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1)). USCIS's regulation lists smuggling described in § 212(a)(6)(E) among the bars that apply when the conduct happens during that period (8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(viii)). Section 316(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e), also lets USCIS consider earlier conduct when the applicant has not shown reform or the earlier conduct bears on present character (8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2)). A smuggling arrangement more than five years before filing falls outside the standard naturalization period, though the same arrangement would still fall inside cancellation's ten years.
VAWA Self-Petitions
The VAWA statute requires good moral character but sets no numeric period. USCIS's regulation asks for police clearances covering the three years before filing (8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(v)), and USCIS policy says it "generally, but not exclusively," looks at those three years. Good moral character must also last through the final decision on the self-petition and any green card application, and USCIS can look at conduct outside the three years when it has reason to believe character is lacking (USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 3, Pt. D, Ch. 2, as of September 2026). Our VAWA self-petition page walks through the other eligibility requirements, including the battery or extreme cruelty showing this decision does not touch.
Voluntary Departure
Voluntary departure requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings requires good moral character "for at least 5 years immediately preceding the alien's application," under INA § 240B(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B). That is the cleanest of the four: five years, stated plainly in the statute. Pre-hearing voluntary departure, under a different subsection, carries different eligibility criteria and is not addressed here.
Why the Smuggling Ground Can Follow Someone for Years
Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i)'s "at any time" language works differently from the four periods above.
It has no expiration.
The smuggling ground matters whenever the person who gave the help later applies for a green card. A parent who is not yet a permanent resident can still meet § 212(a)(6)(E)(i) years after the fact, for example when a U.S. citizen son or daughter age 21 or older files a family-based petition for that parent. At that stage the question is inadmissibility itself, not good moral character, and it is where the discretionary § 212(d)(11) waiver discussed below can come into play. Passing one benefit's good moral character period does not erase the underlying conduct for a later green card application.
This is the part of the ruling we think is easiest to miss: clearing one benefit's good moral character period does not keep the smuggling ground from coming back in a later family-based immigration green card case for the same person, because the ground itself has no time limit.
L-L-R- does not answer how the Board's reasoning applies on a different record, for example one showing a lawful way for the child to enter. The Board's conclusion rested partly on what this record lacked, addressed below.
The § 212(d)(11) Waiver: Narrow, and Not a Cure-All
INA § 212(d)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11), is a discretionary waiver of the smuggling ground of inadmissibility, available only to two narrow groups: returning lawful permanent residents who traveled abroad temporarily and voluntarily, not under a removal order, and people seeking a green card as an immediate relative or through a family-preference category other than the brother-and-sister category. Even within those groups, the waiver only reaches someone who helped a person who, at the time, was their spouse, parent, son, or daughter, and no one else.
It also does not help with the good moral character bar in a cancellation of removal case. A cancellation applicant without a green card is not in either group, and § 101(f)(3) applies the bar to anyone described in the smuggling ground "whether inadmissible or not." That conclusion comes from the statute's text; Matter of L-L-R- did not rule on it.
In Matter of L-L-R-, the Immigration Judge found the respondent statutorily ineligible for this waiver. He did not challenge that finding on appeal, and the Board treated the issue as waived under Matter of F-C-S-, 28 I&N Dec. 788, 789 n.3 (BIA 2024) (deeming an issue waived if not raised on appeal). The Board never decided whether the waiver would otherwise have applied to him, so the Immigration Judge's ineligibility finding stands, unreviewed.
A waived issue and a rejected issue are different outcomes: the Board simply never reached this one. Our immigration waivers overview covers other common waivers.
The Burden Was on the Respondent: This Was Not Automatic
Cancellation of removal is not something the government has to disprove. The applicant has to prove each eligibility requirement, including good moral character (INA § 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)). Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 231-40 (2021), confirms that burden, so a gap in the evidence counts against the applicant. Here the Immigration Judge pretermitted the application, meaning it was denied for ineligibility before any weighing of discretion.
This record had a specific hole.
The respondent's argument was that the smuggler's role ended at the border, so no unlawful entry occurred. He offered no evidence that his son had any lawful way to enter, no evidence the son knew how to seek lawful entry, and no evidence anyone had arranged one. His wife's own testimony contradicted him, describing how they "brought him through the desert," and saying he was apprehended by immigration officials in the desert. The respondent's own evidence included an application in the child's name that listed his entry status as "no lawful status." Faced with that record, not a hypothetical better one, the Board found the evidence insufficient.
This is a record-based outcome, not a rule that every parent who arranged a child's travel automatically loses. The Board listed what the record lacked: documents that would have let the child enter lawfully, arrangements for a lawful entry or for the child to stay at the border, or proof that the child in fact entered lawfully. At the same time, the Board rejected the argument that the conduct falls outside the statute because a smuggler's role ended at the border or because the child later applied for asylum. How the Board would treat a record containing the evidence it found missing is not decided.
We think the evidence the Board found missing is the most practical lesson in L-L-R-.
A Smuggling-Assistance History Needs a Careful Look.
Novo Legal's immigration and crimmigration attorneys work on building the kind of evidentiary record the Board found missing in Matter of L-L-R-.
Schedule a consultationBroader Immigration Implications
The same facts play out differently depending on the benefit and on when the smuggling arrangement happened relative to its clock.
In our view, the dates deserve as much scrutiny as the conduct itself.
Parents Pursuing Cancellation of Removal
A parent with a smuggling-assistance history inside the 10-year window faces the hardest version of this problem, because cancellation's period is the longest of the four and the burden sits entirely with the applicant. The record needs to show, affirmatively, why the bar should not apply. Motive alone fell short in L-L-R-.
Green Card Holders Applying for Naturalization
A green card holder whose smuggling arrangement happened more than five years before filing clears the substantive naturalization period, though USCIS can still weigh that older conduct as evidence of character under § 316(e). Inside the five-year window, the analysis is the one L-L-R- applied to cancellation. Good moral character is not the only question for a green card holder with this history. The same conduct can raise a separate deportability question under INA § 237(a)(1)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i), which covers smuggling assistance before, at the time of, or within five years of any entry, and it can raise the question whether the person was admissible when the green card was granted. A family-unity waiver parallel to § 212(d)(11) exists for green card holders who helped only a spouse, parent, son, or daughter (INA § 237(a)(1)(E)(iii)).
VAWA Self-Petitioners
A self-petitioner's own smuggling-assistance history is measured mainly against the three years before filing, though USCIS can look further back. A separate rule, INA § 204(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(C), lets USCIS find good moral character despite an act that would otherwise bar it, but only if the act is waivable for admissibility purposes and was connected to the self-petitioner's having been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.
Family-Based Green Card Applicants (Later Petitions)
Because § 212(a)(6)(E)(i) has no expiration, a smuggling arrangement that never surfaced in an earlier filing can still surface when a family member later petitions for that same person's green card. This is where the § 212(d)(11) waiver, limited to people who helped only a spouse, parent, son, or daughter, matters most.
How Courts Read the Statute Now
If a federal appeals court reviews Matter of L-L-R-, the standard of review matters. Since 2024, federal appeals courts decide what the immigration statute means for themselves rather than deferring to the Board; they still defer to the agency on fact-bound calls such as whether harm amounts to persecution, and their own earlier precedents remain binding.
What counts as assisting an entry "in violation of law" is a question of statutory meaning that a circuit court would decide for itself. As of September 25, 2026, we found no circuit decision reviewing L-L-R-.
What the Circuit Courts Have Said
Altamirano v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2005), is consistent with L-L-R-'s approach. The Ninth Circuit held that § 212(a)(6)(E)(i) requires an affirmative act of help or encouragement. Knowing presence alone is insufficient. Altamirano itself did not involve paying a smuggler, and L-L-R- did not cite it, but paying and arranging a smuggler is the kind of affirmative act that standard describes. Its holding is binding only within the Ninth Circuit.
As of September 25, 2026, we found no published Tenth Circuit decision on this question.
Colorado sits in the Tenth Circuit, and that gap matters for Novo Legal's home jurisdiction. Whether the Tenth Circuit would apply Matter of L-L-R- the same way, or read the statute differently, remains an open question. A published Tenth Circuit decision on it would control in Colorado. Until then, Matter of L-L-R- is a precedent decision that binds immigration judges and DHS officers nationwide, including in Colorado.
Talk to an Immigration Attorney About a Good Moral Character Issue
Two overlapping situations bring people here.
If a parent in removal proceedings is seeking cancellation and a smuggling arrangement from within the past ten years has come up, L-L-R- shows that the applicant carries the burden on this issue, and that the outcome can turn on what the record shows about how the child was expected to enter the United States.
If someone holds a green card, is preparing a naturalization application, or is a VAWA self-petitioner with a similar history, the relevant look-back period could already be closed, or could close soon. For anyone who will later apply for a green card, including a VAWA self-petitioner, the § 212(a)(6)(E)(i) ground is a separate question worth answering ahead of time rather than after a filing is already in.
In our view, no family should meet this bar for the first time after filing.
Schedule a consultation to go through the specific dates, filings, and evidence that matter in a case like this.
Our firm's intake line is (888) 746-5245. The immigration and removal defense team is also reachable online.
Why Novo Legal
Novo Legal Group is a Spanish-first immigration and civil rights firm, and every attorney is bilingual in English and Spanish. We think a history from years back belongs in the analysis at the start of a case, because it can sit buried inside an application that looks straightforward on the surface.
Matter of L-L-R- is a reminder that good moral character analysis rewards a lawyer who reads the whole record, including every earlier filing. In our view, a smuggling-assistance history should be evaluated across every filing it could touch, because each benefit measures it differently.